A meta-ethics for professional morality.

Abstract

In the ordinary course of events, we expect to hear people give advice or voice positions on issues by virtue of their professional capacity. As philosophers, we expect this in the case of 'technical hypotheticals' (In my professional capacity as an engineer, I advise that, if you want that bridge to stand up, you will need more struts.) Somewhat more difficult, but still explicable, is the 'technical imperative.' (As your doctor, I must tell you that you must never work that hard again.) But in addition to these covert and overt acknowledgments of professional expertise, we sometimes attribute to professionals a morality of their own, attached to their professional role. By that I mean to say, we feel that in reaching decisions professionals are more constrained by their professional values thank are nonprofessionals and, conversely, take into less account those considerations which ordinarily apply. Now this is truly puzzling and will take some explanation; for morality is not, after all, like ajacket which you may put on or take off (perhaps exchanging it for a white coat or even a cardigan sweater). For our standard academic conception of morality is one of a unitary construct, applying in the same way and with equal force to all human beings (with account taken for morally relevant differences). This is the underpinning to the principle of generalization in ethics. Are we merely wrong when we speak of a discrete professional morality? Is this perhaps just a loosefafon de parler; or, does the concept of professional morality' point to some real complication in our description or reconstruction of moral discourse?