A melancholy skeptic

Lívia Guimarães

doi:10.1590/s0100-512x2003000200003

Abstract

Hume variously viewed the association of philosophy and melancholy in different stages of his development. In this essay I propose to follow this progress, beginning with his youthful belief that a philosophical life would shelter its pursuer from melancholy. In my hypothesis, for the mature Hume knowledge in the broad sense of wide experience alone can ease melancholy states, while knowledge as narrow rational speculation proves itself untenable, as it triggers a state of melancholy despair in the agent.

Highlights

Knowledge is merely peripheral to the gloomy person’s condition; it is not so when it comes to the melancholy skeptic or to the sensitive melancholy
In the broad sense of wide experience, knowledge can lighten up the sorrowful
Knowledge in the sense of rational speculation seems to weigh down the brooding skeptic

Summary

Introduction

For Hume melancholy is a sentimental condition, a morbid state of sensibility. No longer a follower, Hume gives philosophical tradition voice in a set of essays that is somehow reminiscent of his youthful aspirations: “The Epicurean,” “The Stoic,” “The Platonist,” and “The Sceptic.” 3 Their subject is human happiness imperiled by misfortune. The Skeptic adds, is not necessarily useful to bringing about the state of passions that gives support to human happiness; it can even pose an obstacle to it.

Results

Conclusion