A Medieval Theory of Supposition

Abstract

ion from its individualization in which it exists in individuals is considered to be the signified object of a term in simple supposition. The realists, therefore, admit two formal signified objects, the individuals (and that only in personal supposition) and the common nature, and that in simple supposition. For that reason, according to them not only natural supposition is different from personal supposition, but also simple supposition, though both, natural and simple supposition exercise their significative function.38 It seems that the first clash on this score took place between Ockham and Burleigh. Ockham openly qualifies this opinion of the realists or the 'communiter loquentium' as a falsehood.89 Burleigh went immediately over to the counterattack. He wrote: Some criticize the formulation: Simple supposition is given when a term stands for that which it signifies; for they criticize the older ones and say that this is false and impossible. They rather say that personal supposition is given when a term stands for that which it signifies or for the things signified. But that simple supposition is given, when a term stands for the intention or the intentions of the mind . . . But without any doubt this is quite irreasonably said . . .40 38Cfr. Javellus, op. cit., fol. 172b, (a Thomist); a very instructive explanation is given by the Scotist, Johannes de Magistris, Summularum Petri Hispani glosulae exactae ad mentem Doctoris Subtuis, Tr. VII, Venice, 1490. 39Cfr. Summa logicae, p. I, c. 64; p. 178, 33 rss. 40Burleigh, De puritate artis logicae, Tractatus longior, Tr. I, p. I, c 3; ed. p. 7, 5 ss.