A Mechanistic Approach to Perception and the Human Mind

Abstract

Abstract I doubt whether any previous development in science has aroused, interested, and divided philosophers as rapidly as has the birth of the discipline of Artificial Intelligence. This new scientific endeavour has a history, strictly speaking, of little more than thirty years (McCorduck .1979) but already its objectives and achievements are increasingly the subjects of philosophical discussion. The idea that undeniably inanimate chunks of silicon and copper might be able to pass for people (when judged by their ability to solve problems, answer questions, and generally act intelligently) seems to have thrown philosophy into disarray. I wonder why several centuries of scientific research on real brains failed to engage the interest of many philosophers (with some notable exceptions, of course) when a few decades of work on artificial thinking machines has stirred up such a philosophical storm. I suppose that it must be because computers are so obviously mechanistic devices with out any magic in them: or if they do behave magically, the magic must come spontaneously out of the complexity of their material structure, rather than being added to the recipe as a kind of spiritual spice. However much computers are to be admired or feared, they are clearly not mysterious in the way that some people think people to be.