A master–slave game optimal scheduling strategy for park-integrated energy systems based on adjustable robust optimization

Abstract

As the bridge between power companies and users, the integrated energy system has become one of the carriers of energy reform, energy-saving, and emission reduction. Based on this, a master–slave game bilevel optimization model considering power company–park-integrated energy system (PIES)–user is established. In the upper game, the power company, as the leader, takes the maximization of its interests as the goal to consider and formulate the price of purchasing and selling electricity with the park. As a follower, combined with the fluctuation of electricity price and the electricity demand of its equipment, the park determines the relationship between purchasing and selling electricity with the power company. In the lower-level game, the park becomes the leader, taking into account the energy needs of users and formulating a reasonable price for selling energy. Users, as followers, intend to maximize consumer surplus and adjust their energy demand strategies to achieve the best energy consumption experience. Analyzing the properties of the game, it is verified that there is a unique Nash equilibrium solution in the game model. At the same time, the idea of solving the distribution of the model is adopted, and the equilibrium solution of the model is obtained by using limited information. In addition, the output uncertainty of renewable energy in the park is dealt with by adjustable robust optimization. Finally, aiming at achieving a win–win situation among all stakeholders, the proposed game model is verified to effectively solve the equilibrium strategy problem among the PIES, the power company, and users through simulation analysis of an example.