A Manifesto Against Failures of Understanding: Ian McEwan’s Atonement

Abstract

ABSTRACTIn this article I will explore the ways in which Ian McEwan’s novel Atonement (2001) engages with contemporary scientific and philosophical theories of intersubjectivity. Recent cognitive and philosophical approaches to intersubjectivity deem as reductive an understanding of social interactions solely in terms of “theory of mind,” i.e., as inferential and observational processes, and provide instead a multilayered account of intersubjectivity incorporating the embodied and affective coupling between self and others (primary intersubjectivity), the capacity to participate in cooperative projects (secondary intersubjectivity), and narrative competences/practices. Through a close reading of how McEwan stages and reflects on the complex interplay between understanding and misunderstanding lying at the heart of social interaction, I will argue that Atonement can be read as a critique of complex forms of social interaction (including storytelling), advocating instead a reliance on embodied, affective, and collaborative forms of intersubjectivity.