Abstract
AbstractMortgage risk assessment is based on hazard models using data on “seasoned” mortgages, endorsed in previous years. These models assume that the lender’s pricing decision has no effect on the parameters of the hazard function. This paper argues that, when indicators of creditworthiness that can be influenced by applicants have a significant effect on credit cost, applicants behave strategically to influence the information disclosed to lenders. This gives rise to a Lucas Critique in which models generally perform well but occasionally fail because applicants are able and motivated to behave strategically.
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