Abstract

Abstract : When the United States went to war in Iraq in March 2003, the professed goals were to end the repressive rule of Saddam Husayn's regime, uncover the long-hidden weapons of mass destruction that had eluded a decade of UN-led inspections, and prevent further cooperation between Baghdad and the Islamist extremists responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001. Less mentioned but by no means absent was the intention of introducing real democratic values and institutions to Iraq and making the fledgling successor government a beacon for the region to emulate. Advisers to George W. Bush's Administration dubbed the neoconservatives or neocons quickly became known for their claims that the war would be quick, that the Iraqis would welcome the Americans as liberators and not conquerors and shower them with rose petals and rice, and that the Iraqis as the region s staunchest democrats would quickly turn the New Iraq into a democratic showplace that was the envy of the region. In the Pentagon, the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, was equally determined to make the war in Iraq the showcase of what a transformed military force could accomplish with smaller deployments and greater mission integration. The war of shock and awe was to usher in 21st century warfare against the new asymmetric kind of warfare of the future the war on terrorism.

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