A Long Way to God’s Mutability: a Reply to Azadegan

Abstract

1 A Long Way to God’s Mutability: a Reply to Azadegan Amirhossein Zadyousefi Department of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University (TMU), Tehran, Iran amirhosein.zadyusefi@modares.ac.ir Abstract: In “on the incompatibility of God's knowledge of particulars and the doctrine of divine immutability: Towards a reform in Islamic theology” Ebrahim Azadegan tries to make a room for what he calls a reform in Islamic theology. Affirming that God’s knowledge of particulars is inconsistent with God’s immutability, Azadegan puts forward a theory of God’s knowledge of particulars, inspired from Sadrā’s philosophy, which allows one to (i) explain God’s knowledge of particulars and (ii) hold that God is mutable. That is, Azadegan, accusing Avicenna of having the dogma of God’s immutability, abandons God’s immutability in favor of God’s knowledge of particulars and thinks that a God who knows particulars but is mutable is more perfect than a God who does not know particulars but is immutable. In this paper, I shall show that Azadegan’s project is not as easy as he thinks and will criticize it. Keywords: God’s knowledge of particulars, God’s mutability, God’s knowledge by presence, Avicenna, Azadegan 2 1. Introduction In “on the incompatibility of God's knowledge of particulars and the doctrine of divine immutability: Towards a reform in Islamic theology” Ebrahim Azadegan tries to make a room for what he calls a reform in Islamic theology. Affirming that God’s knowledge of particulars is inconsistent with God’s immutability, Azadegan puts forward a theory of God’s knowledge of particulars, inspired from Sadrā’s philosophy, which allows one to (i) explain God’s knowledge of particulars and (ii) hold that God is mutable. That is, Azadegan, accusing Avicenna of having the dogma of God’s immutability, abandons God’s immutability in favor of God’s knowledge of particulars and thinks that a God who knows particulars but is mutable is more perfect than a God who does not know particulars but is immutable. In this paper, I shall show that Azadegan’s project is not as easy as he thinks and will criticize it. Let us have a short look at Azadegan’s project. 2. Azadegan’s Project Azadegan’s paper consists in three parts. In the following, I will present a brief summary of these parts. In the first part of his paper, Azadegan tries to delineate the main contours of a debate in Islamic intellectual tradition over God’s knowledge of particulars – a debate chiefly between Ghazālī and Avicenna – and shows how God’s knowledge of particulars is in tension with God’s immutability. He summarizes this debate in the following argument: 1. God is omniscient. 2. Every omniscient being knows all past, present, and future particular states of the world and of individuals. 3. Particular states of the world and of individuals change. 3 4. Every sort of knowledge will change with change of its object. 5. [Therefore] God’s knowledge of occurrent particulars changes. 6. Knowledge is an intrinsic property of every individual, including God. 7. [Therefore] God’s intrinsic property regarding His knowledge of particulars changes. 8. God’s intrinsic properties are His essential properties. 9. [Therefore] God’s essential properties change. 10. [Therefore] God is not immutable.1 and then states that God’s knowledge of particulars, in both Avicenna’s and Ghazālī’s views, is inconsistent with God’s immutability.2 That is, if one holds that God knows particulars (premise 2), according to the above argument, one has to accept God is not immutable (premise 10). According to Azadegan, Avicenna denies God’s knowledge of particulars, i.e., premise 2 of the above argument, in order to avoid its conclusion (premise 10).3 But, Azadegan is well aware that only temporal knowledge of changing particulars entails a change in God’s essence. So, he mentions that Avicenna by introducing knowledge in a universal way tries to save premise 2 of the above argument while denying its 5th premise.4 But, Azadegan thinks that Avicenna’s appeal to knowing in a universal way does not help him and this way of knowing particulars “cannot in...