A Long-Term Counterinsurgency Strategy

Abstract

The rapid, decisive campaign conducted against the Taliban by US Operations Forces (SOF) in conjunction with the Northern Alliance and supported by US airpower in the opening phases of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) captured the attention of military professionals throughout the world--allies and potential adversaries alike. Heralded as a template for future military transformation by the most enthusiastic proponents, even the less sanguine observers were forced to acknowledge an impressive synergy and economy of force in the SOF and airpower combination. Nearly eight years later, former International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) Commander, General Stanley McChrystal, issued a tactical directive seeking, among other things, to limit the use of Close Air Support (CAS) by NATO forces in Afghanistan. (1) This action followed several high-profile incidences of collateral damage caused by air strikes in support of ISAF forces and signaled a broader shift in theater strategy toward a counterinsurgency (COIN) centric approach similar to that successfully employed in conjunction with the surge in Iraq. While comparisons are inevitable, such a strategy needs to address significant additional challenges posed by the unique cultural and geographical characteristics of Afghanistan which could in effect make the restriction of airpower as much a danger to the achievement of strategic objectives as the collateral damage that it seeks to avoid. One prominent dilemma is the central role that SOF continues to play in performing many key strategic functions, such as counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency operations. There is a paradox posed by the fact that the characteristics, which render SOF an ideal choice for Afghanistan's dispersed and geographically isolated rural insurgency, also engender increased reliance upon the mobility, responsiveness, and firepower provided by airpower. This article will examine the unique suitability of SOF to meet strategic objectives in Afghanistan, explore the synergistic relationship between SOF and airpower, and assess the strategic utility of this combat-proven combination in an irregular warfare environment. Putting the Special in Operations Operations Forces share a number of uniquely defining qualities which distinguish them from their conventional counterparts. Despite a broad consensus that SOF have a distinct military culture with distinctive capabilities, no universally accepted, definitive work exists codifying the character of special operations. There is, however, a substantial amount of published material on the subject. This article is an attempt to construct a platform for further analysis by synthesizing the key elements of several notable contemporary special operations theorists. Adaptability, Flexibility, and Versatility In his analysis of the decisive characteristics of SOF following the now iconic tactical and operational successes of US SOF teamed with the Northern Alliance over Taliban forces in late 2001 and early 2002, Colonel John Jogerst notes You don't know what you need until you need it. A wide range of capabilities in effective quantities is a good hedge against tomorrow's threat. (2) Admiral Eric T. Olsen, Commander, United States Operations Command (USSOCOM), similarly posits: We need to be responsive enough to adjust rapidly to what the enemy throws at us, and we need to have the agility to transcend the spectrum of conflict. (3) Colin Gray affirms the innovative nature of special operations, further noting that successful SOF units such as the British Air Service have institutionalized the ability to reinvent themselves as national security interests require. (4) Building upon Gray's work, Australian Squadron Leader David Jeffcoat identifies unorthodox means as one of his proposed characteristics of SOF, which are required to adapt their approach to each operation and come up 'with a distinctive theory of victory. …