Abstract
The perceived need for institutional and constitutional reform has figured prominently in the Italian political debate over the past three decades, yet the outcome has been characterised by continual failure. The most recent failure – the rejection of the centre-right's proposed root and branch overhaul of the Constitution in a referendum held in June 2006 – offers a valuable prism through which to analyse the main institutional deficiencies (as apparently perceived by the political class) of the Italian political system, and the attempt to overcome them in the past 15 years: executive–legislative relations (and notably the powers of the Prime Minister and bicameralism), devolution, and (formally beyond the Constitution but inseparable from its functioning) the electoral system. The decisive rejection of the centre-right's proposals in 2006 increases the dilemma confronting the Italian political system in its quest to secure constitutional reform by precluding certain types and methods of reform while failing to quash aspirations for its achievement amongst politicians and the public.
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