A Lightweight Anonymous Authentication Protocol with Perfect Forward Secrecy for Wireless Sensor Networks

Abstract

Due to their frequent use in unattended and hostile deployment environments, the security in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) has attracted much interest in the past two decades. However, it remains a challenge to design a lightweight authentication protocol for WSNs because the designers are confronted with a series of desirable security requirements, e.g., user anonymity, perfect forward secrecy, resistance to de-synchronization attack. Recently, the authors presented two authentication schemes that attempt to provide user anonymity and to resist various known attacks. Unfortunately, in this work we shall show that user anonymity of the two schemes is achieved at the price of an impractical search operation—the gateway node may search for every possible value. Besides this defect, they are also prone to smart card loss attacks and have no provision for perfect forward secrecy. As our main contribution, a lightweight anonymous authentication scheme with perfect forward secrecy is designed, and what we believe the most interesting feature is that user anonymity, perfect forward secrecy, and resistance to de-synchronization attack can be achieved at the same time. As far as we know, it is extremely difficult to meet these security features simultaneously only using the lightweight operations, such as symmetric encryption/decryption and hash functions.