Abstract
<p class="p1">Yemen’s 2013–2014 National Dialogue Conference paved the way for Yemen to transition from a unitary to federal system of government. This is a common trajectory for States emerging from conflict as federalism offers the hope for greater democratic governance and inclusivity. Nevertheless, there is a danger in assuming that there is an ideal federal model to emulate or that federalism is itself a guaranteed remedy for political dysfunction and authoritarianism. Transitioning to federalism is an arduous, expensive, and technically complicated process. Such transitions can also renew conflict if, prior to the drafting of the federal constitution, key issues related to the design of the new system are not addressed or there is a lack of consensus on how to address those issues. Indeed, this was the case in Yemen. Prior to drafting its new federal constitution, Yemen struggled to reach sufficient political consensus on three key issues: (1) the formation of federal regions; (2) the structure of the new federal system; and (3) how powers were to be distributed in the State, including over natural resources management. This lack of consensus during the National Dialogue Conference resulted in the Constitution Drafting Committee having the responsibility of making highly controversial political decisions about Yemen’s future as a federal State. This article examines how Yemen’s transition to federalism was undermined by the inability to reach sufficient consensus on three key transition issues prior to the drafting of the 2015 federal constitution.
Highlights
In 2011, Yemen joined in the wave of Arab Spring revolutions sweeping across the Middle East and North Africa
Prior to drafting its new federal constitution, Yemen struggled to reach sufficient political consensus on three key issues: (1) the formation of federal regions; (2) the structure of the new federal system; and (3) how powers were to be distributed in the State, including over natural resources management
Sommadossi and Mujais focused on halting any further escalation of violence—not on reforming Yemen’s State structure.4 Envisioned in the Gulf Initiative was a two-phased political transition that would conclude with a referendum vote on a new Yemeni constitution and the inauguration of a President elected under the new constitution
Summary
Post-conflict unitary States in particular tend to view federalism as a pathway to peace, as implementing a federal structure often produces an inclusive government that incorporates previously marginalised voices into the political process. This article examines how the lack of political agreement on three key transition issues prior to the drafting of Yemen’s federal constitution undermined Yemen’s ability to adopt a federal system during its 2012–2014 transitional process To this end, after first providing relevant historical background on Yemen (Part II) the article outlines the variations in unitary, decentralised unitary, and federal State structures (Part III), and explains why unitary States such as Yemen gravitate towards federalism as a solution for political dysfunction (Part IV). The article puts forward some concluding thoughts on Yemen’s attempted transition to federalism (Part VI)
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