A Leakage-Resilient Certificateless Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Withstanding Side-Channel Attacks

Tsung-Che Hsieh,Yuh-Min Tseng,Sen-Shan Huang

doi:10.1109/access.2020.3006841

Abstract

Certificateless public-key cryptography has conquered both the certificate management problem in the traditional public-key cryptography and the key escrow problem in the ID-based public-key cryptography. Certificateless authenticated key exchange (CLAKE) protocol is an important primitive of the certificateless public-key cryptography. A CLAKE protocol is employed to provide both mutual authentication and establishing a session key between two participators. Indeed, all conventional public-key cryptographies have encountered a new kind of attack, named “side-channel attacks”. Fortunately, leakage-resilient cryptography is a flexible approach to withstand such attacks. However, the design of leakage-resilient CLAKE (LR-CLAKE) protocols is not studied. In the article, by extending the well-known extended-Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) model, we present the security notions (adversary model) of LR-CLAKE protocols, called continual-leakage-resilient eCK (CLReCK) model. The first LR-CLAKE protocol withstanding side-channel attacks is proposed. By employing the proof technique of the generic bilinear group (GBG) model, we formally prove the security of our protocol in the CLReCK model.

Highlights

To discard the certificate management problem in the traditional public-key cryptography, the ID-based public-key cryptography [1], [2] was presented, but it encounters the key escrow problem
CONTRIBUTIONS In the article, we first define the associated continual-leakage-resilient eCK (CLReCK) model for LR-Certificateless authenticated key exchange (CLAKE) protocols to model the abilities of adversaries under the certificateless public-key cryptography (CL-PKC) settings
By employing the proof technique of the generic bilinear group (GBG) model [26], we formally prove the security of our protocol in the CLReCK model

Summary

INTRODUCTION

To discard the certificate management problem in the traditional public-key cryptography, the ID-based public-key cryptography [1], [2] was presented, but it encounters the key escrow problem. The CL-PKC settings were extremely studied, such as certificateless public-key encryption (CLE) [4]–[7], certificateless signature (CLS) [8]–[11] and certificateless authenticated key exchange (CLAKE) [12]–[15]. Two primitives of leakage-resilient certificateless public-key cryptography, namely, numerous leakage-resilient certificateless encryption (LR-CLE) [20] and signature (LR-CLS) [21], [22] schemes were proposed. The first LR-CLAKE protocol will be proposed to fill the vacancy for the leakage-resilient certificateless public-key cryptography. B. CONTRIBUTIONS In the article, we first define the associated CLReCK model for LR-CLAKE protocols to model the abilities of adversaries under the CL-PKC settings. Each user’s long-term private keys consist of a self-chosen secret key and an identity key generated by the KGC.

RELATED WORK

SYSTEM OPERATIONS OF LR-CLAKE PROTOCOLS

SECURITY ANALYSIS

VIII. CONCLUSIONS