A Kantian System? Democracy and Third-Party Conflict Resolution

Abstract

While constructivist scholars have recognized an important role for norms in international relations, they have not considered the changing proportion of democratic states in the international system as a potential source of norm formation. I argue that democratic norms become international norms as the proportion of democratic states in the international system increases, focusing on the democratic norm of third party dispute resolution. I reach the novel conclusion that non-democratic states are more likely to behave like democratic states, adopting democratic norms, as the proportion of democracies increases. Empirical analysis of peaceful settlement attempts of territorial claims in the Americas supports this hypothesis. Third party settlement is sixteen times more likely for non-democratic dyads when the proportion of democracies in the system is 50% than when the proportion is zero. My theory and empirical results offer new insight into the democratic peace literature and the constructivist literature on international norms.