A Kantian Stance on Teleology in Biology

Abstract

Kant describes organisms as the beings ‘which first give objective reality to the concept of a purpose […] of nature […], and which hence give natural science the basis for a teleology’ (Kant 1987: 255 [5:375–376]). Yet, even though organisms are the basis for teleology, they should still be accounted for in terms of mechanical causality since it is the only way to reach the level of scientific knowledge: ‘Without mechanism we cannot gain insight into the nature of things’ (Kant 1987: 295 [5:410]). What, then, is the role of teleology? Why can or should we not do away with it if mechanism is the only true form of explanation? The aim of this paper is to show firstly why Kant believes we should hang on to teleology, and secondly that his views on the matter are still relevant to contemporary epistemology despite the fact that theories of evolution now allow purely mechanical explanations of organic processes. By considering Kant’s account in light of that of Daniel Dennett, I elucidate what I believe to be the strength of Kant’s theory, namely the pragmatic role it assigns to reflective teleological principles.