Abstract
Abstract This chapter argues against the view of Kantian freedom encapsulated in Henry Allison’s Incorporation Thesis, which has gained widespread support among Kantians. According to Allison, Kant thought that all action, even heteronomous action, requires an act of freedom. So construed, Kant’s disagreement with Hume was not simply about the freedom required for moral agency, but for all agency more generally, so that even if Kant’s argument for the categorical imperative were to fail, our agency could still be free in a morally neutral and limited sense. This chapter argues that this view is unable to meet the criterion necessary for its successful defense, and that attempts to do so face a trilemma as well as collapse Kant’s distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives. It concludes that Kant locates freedom in the capacity to will autonomously—in accordance with the categorical imperative.
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