A hybrid evolutionary game-theoretic and system dynamics approach for analysis of implementation strategies of green technological innovation under government intervention

Abstract

Green technological innovation (GTI) is accompanied by a high level of risk and cost. Therefore, choosing the optimal strategy for its implementation has attracted the attention of decision-makers. In this regard, technological firms have two strategies: collaboration with green startups and performing independent green R&D. This paper analyzes the impact of maturity level and innovation level of green startups, as well as the competitive intensity between technological firms on their evolutionary behavior. For this purpose, an evolutionary game model was developed, and the impact of government static and dynamic intervention on the firms’ innovative behavior was investigated by the system dynamics. There are six possible stable equilibrium points. The results suggest that when the government adopts static intervention, at the same time, reducing the maturity level and increasing the innovation level of the green startups decreases technological firms' desire to collaborate with them. When the government adopts dynamic intervention, then it would be more desirable for the technological firms to collaborate with green startups. If a technological firm can increase its product sales compared to the competitor, this change will affect the evolution trend of the system. Increasing sale amounts by a technological firm leads to more own stability rate, decreasing it for its competitor.