A Hybrid Concession Mechanism for Negotiating Software Agents in Competitive Environments

Abstract

This paper presents a new hybrid concession mechanism for negotiating agents. It considers both the current concession behavior of the proposing agent and the concession offered by its opponent in the last counteroffer to create a new offer. The proposed mechanism is a kind of imitating offer generation tactic. The difference is that it uses the first order difference between the two last counteroffers received from the opponent as its current reservation value which is one of the important inputs in generating a new offer. In this paper, a bilateral negotiation over a single issue is considered where agents have adverse interests over the issue such as price. Four negotiation environmental settings are used to test the proposed offer generating mechanism. The experimental results show that the proposed hybrid concession mechanism outperforms the time-dependent concession tactic in terms of utility rate while performing lower in one negotiation environment and similarly in most of negotiation environments.