Abstract
This article examines a model in which two jurisdictions engage in fiscal competition. The jurisdictions’ strategic variables are labor tax rates and types of local public goods. Both are determined by majority voting. The article finds that in Nash equilibrium, labor tax rates will be efficiently chosen such that quantities of local public goods will achieve the first-best level. Furthermore, there are two symmetric Nash equilibria for the types of local public goods. These two equilibria, when they both exist, exhibit less public sector differentiation than if there were no mobility. However, a primary difference between them is that when the net gain of more population increases, in one equilibrium jurisdictions will raise the similarity of local public goods to attract population, but in the other equilibrium jurisdictions will differentiate themselves more to prevent harsh competition.
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