Abstract

IoT systems differ from traditional Internet systems in that they are different in scale, footprint, power requirements, cost and security concerns that are often overlooked. IoT systems inherently present different fail-safe capabilities than traditional computing environments while their threat landscapes constantly evolve. Further, IoT devices have limited collective security measures in place. Therefore, there is a need for different approaches in threat assessments to incorporate the interdependencies between different IoT devices. In this paper, we run through the design cycle to provide a security-focused approach to the design of IoT systems using a use case, namely, an intelligent solar-panel project called Daedalus. We utilise STRIDE/DREAD approaches to identify vulnerabilities using a thin secure element that is an embedded, tamper proof microprocessor chip that allows the storage and processing of sensitive data. It benefits from low power demand and small footprint as a crypto processor as well as is compatible with IoT requirements. Subsequently, a key agreement based on an asymmetric cryptographic scheme, namely B-SPEKE was used to validate and authenticate the source. We find that end-to-end and independent stand-alone procedures used for validation and encryption of the source data originating from the solar panel are cost-effective in that the validation is carried out once and not several times in the chain as is often the case. The threat model proved useful not so much as a panacea for all threats but provided the framework for the consideration of known threats, and therefore appropriate mitigation plans to be deployed.

Highlights

  • Recent developments in sensor networks and the need for smart meters, automated home devices and smart cities have led to the rise in the development of Internet of Things (IoT) technology-enabling devices to be connected and communicating with each other [1]

  • Based on the recommendations for addressing the risks identified by the DREAD analysis, we focused on three security mechanisms with which to enhance the API, namely, secure hashing (SHA256), public key asymmetric signatures (RSA-SSA, [56], ECDSA, [57]) and secure key management (SPEKE, [58])

  • We show procedures for a system design process focused on security in the way of a threat modelling procedure

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Summary

Introduction

Recent developments in sensor networks and the need for smart meters, automated home devices and smart cities have led to the rise in the development of IoT technology-enabling devices to be connected and communicating with each other [1]. Communication between the IoT devices and smart hub is usually wireless and is connected to a network and the Internet via a traditional wireless router. Given the heterogeneous architecture of IoT devices, an adversary might capture the traffic among the different components of an IoT based smart home infrastructure, which relates to passive or active eavesdropping. As another example, an IoT device having insufficient authentication to ascertain identity as in the case of smartphones allows a threat actor to spoof themselves as the owners (impersonation). It is easy to launch a Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) by flooding the hub or router with numerous requests

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