A History of the Afghan War (2001-2021) from a Defense Diplomacy Perspective

ASEAN’s Defense Diplomacy and China’s Military Diplomacy Penghong Cai (bio) Unlike other major powers outside Southeast Asia, China directly borders the region and lays claim to being at least partially included as a Southeast Asian state. This geographic connection is an important dimension of the geopolitical and security environment for China. In the nineteenth century or even earlier, the Western intrusion into China followed Southeast Asian land and maritime routes, and in the early 1940s Japan first occupied the Indochinese Peninsula and then southwest China. The region surrounding southernmost China, referred to as the south gate of China, has significant implications for the country’s security. Therefore, China logically harbors doubts about a newly developed mechanism related to defense cooperation at its doorstep. Labeled as a tool of defense diplomacy, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) is diplomatically and tactically supported by China, but philosophically and practically the grouping’s vision of defense diplomacy remains divergent from the concept and policy of Chinese military diplomacy. This essay first examines the achievements of the ADMM-Plus and its benefits for China. It then analyzes the concept of defense diplomacy in Chinese military culture and concludes by considering obstacles to the future of the ADMM-Plus from a Chinese perspective. The ADMM-Plus’s Achievements and Benefits for China The ADMM-Plus was established in 2010 as a collective platform to ensure ASEAN centrality and realize the ADMM vision of being outward-looking, open, and inclusive. It consists of eighteen member states, including the ten ASEAN members plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. All the outside states have consented to ASEAN’s central role in regional affairs. When the ADMM-Plus began, some observers expected it to be “one of the more substantial pieces of Asia’s multilateral security architecture.”1 [End Page 89] These expectations require the ADMM-Plus to set up rules and carry out substantial activities. The last six years have seen some achievements. The ADMM-Plus has contributed norms for building regional security architecture and proposed new concepts like “dynamic equilibrium.” At the same time, it has upheld the ASEAN values of respecting national sovereignty, exercising self-restraint in defense diplomacy, finding peaceful solutions to disputes, maintaining ASEAN centrality, and promoting cooperative security (from Europe to ASEAN). In practice, the ADMM-Plus has set up working groups in nontraditional security areas such as counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), military medicine, and peacekeeping and has gradually begun working in traditional security fields like maritime security—for example, by setting up a hotline for preventing incidents at sea. The most significant accomplishment of the ADMM-Plus is the joint military exercises it has held since its establishment. The most recent exercise was held in Brunei and Singapore in early May 2016 and comprised 3,500 personnel, 18 naval vessels, 25 aircraft, and 40 special forces teams from all eighteen member countries. Another significant result is that the ADMM-Plus has given the United States and China opportunities to work together despite tensions in the South China Sea. China supports and benefits from the ADMM-Plus process. It regards ASEAN countries as important neighbors and tries to improve its relationships with them through the ADMM-Plus. China dispatches its defense ministers to take part in the ministerial meetings, while only dispatching deputy ministerial officers to attend the Shangri-La Dialogue conferences. China can take advantage of the ADMM-Plus to deliver and circulate defense policies, associate with old and new counterparts and participants, learn different points of view, and establish necessary contacts. The forum also supplies China with specific information on the development of new security mechanisms and how they may affect China’s military diplomacy. Defense Diplomacy in the View of China’s Military Diplomacy Defense diplomacy is a traditional security concept used for the realpolitik purposes of strengthening Western allies against common enemies.2 The concept’s intellectual roots are in the use of defense alliances [End Page 90] as a tool to defend the Western democracies from Cold War enemies like China, but the emphasis now is on peacetime military cooperation and assistance. China...

Asia's multilateral defence diplomacy is an increasingly important aspect of regional politics and a burgeoning area of interest for scholarship. The creation of the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) in 2002, the inauguration of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) in May 2006 and the arrival of the ADMM-Plus process in October 2010 has seen the establishment of a major new stream of regional dialogue and diplomacy. These arrangements also have a track two multilateral partner--the Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutes (NADI), a parallel arrangement to the long-running and influential ASEAN-ISIS. (1) These processes are increasingly attracting interest from analysts, although the body of work remains comparatively small alongside the attention lavished on the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In 2012 a special issue of the journal Asian Security examined Asia's defence diplomacy, including China's activities in the region and the contribution of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). (2) Scholars have asked whether there is a Southeast Asian model of defence cooperation that might be emulated or referenced by others. (3) The origins and function of the SLD have been the subject of close academic scrutiny, (4) and there is a growing body of research looking at bilateral defence diplomacy (5) and the connection between bilateral and multilateral arrangements. (6) To date, however, most of this work has been more concerned with describing the evolution of defence diplomacy in the region, its origins and purpose than it has been with considering recent developments in the context of theoretical debates. (7) This article seeks to build on the existing literature by outlining some ways in which Asia's defence diplomacy can inform and challenge contemporary debates in international relations theory. (8) In particular, it looks at the rise of multilateral defence diplomacy against the backdrop of the scholarship concerning norm change and institutional innovation. At its heart are two questions: why was multilateral defence diplomacy so late to arrive in Asia, and what explains its rapid rise? The article is divided into three parts. The first section briefly defines defence diplomacy and outlines the general trajectory of East Asia's defence and military diplomacy in recent decades. The second part explores why defence diplomacy has been a relative laggard when compared to other forms of institutionalized security dialogue, and what explains its recent rise. I argue that explanations that stress the catalytic of external shocks such as the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) or changes in the distribution of power or threats (for example, the rise of China) are underdetermining. Rather, the explanation advanced here focuses on agents and changing norms around multilateral defence cooperation. Using the lens of constitutive localization, I argue that the institutional innovation that has occurred since 2006 reflects a strategic calculation on the part of ASEAN elites, who adopted and adapted ideas initially put forward by outsiders in order to maintain ASEAN's central place in the regional security architecture. Its rise has been helped by the changing role of militaries in some East Asian states and its rapid institutionalization owes much to historical contingency, in particular the interests of two influential ASEAN Chairs in Indonesia and Vietnam. The final part of the article offers a brief assessment of the future prospects and influence of regional multilateral defence diplomacy. Defining Defence Diplomacy Defence diplomacy is a relatively new arrival in the lexicon of Asia-Pacific security. One study of the vocabulary of regional security published in 2008 includes numerous terms for diplomacy and engagement but notably omits defence or military diplomacy. (9) What then does defence diplomacy mean in Asia? Like many expressions in the security studies lexicon, the origin and meaning of the term are contested. …

The Covid-19 pandemic left many nations in a dilemma to protect their respective countries. Indonesia carried out diplomacy with various countries that had the capability to help Indonesia overcome the pandemic through various diplomatic channels, one of which was China, even though it closed itself at the start of the pandemic. The involvement of military in carrying out the action shows the role of defense diplomacy in the cooperation between Indonesia and China to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic. The problem being studied is the role of Indonesia's defense diplomacy in supporting Indonesia-China cooperation in overcoming the pandemic; along with the contributing and inhibiting factors in the cooperation. The aim of the research is to analyze the role of Indonesian defense diplomacy in Indonesia-China cooperation along with the contributing and inhibiting factors in this cooperation. The research method used is qualitative method. Primary data was obtained through individual interviews and secondary data through library research. The results revealed that Indonesia's defense diplomacy played a role in supporting the activities of the Ministry of Health, and supporting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The contributing factors are China's help during the pandemic and military utilization in pandemic relief. The inhibiting factors are the prevalence of misinformation, the lack of preparedness in dealing with health threats, and the facilities, personnel and communication that are not yet optimal.

The Sulu-Sulawesi Sea is a strategic trade route so that it becomes one of the policy priorities. Strategic value does not necessarily bring benefits, but also brings security threats such as piracy, piracy and kidnapping with a ransom demand. In an effort to overcome this, since 2017 the Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement in the Port Visit scheme has been built between the three countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The purpose of this study is to analyze the form of Port Visit cooperation and to analyze the Indonesian Defense Diplomacy Strategy in this cooperation. This research uses defense theory, strategy theory, and defense diplomacy theory. This study uses a qualitative descriptive analysis research method. The data collection carried out in this study used primary data through interviews and secondary data from a literature review of journals, books, reports, and internet-based sources. The Trilateral Port Visit Indomalphi cooperation is a response in dealing with transnational crimes in the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea area. With various series of activities, this cooperation plays an important role in efforts to maintain regional security and stability and provides the authority to maintain the safety of all Indonesian citizens as mandated by the law. The Indonesian Defense Diplomacy Strategy in the Indomalphi Port Visit is aimed at increasing mutual trust and military capacity in terms of coordination, communication and piracy capture training. Therefore, the defense diplomacy strategy in this study can be said to have fulfilled the two main characters of defense diplomacy, namely; defense diplomacy to build mutual trust (CBMs) and defense diplomacy to build defense capacity (CB).

The Sulu-Sulawesi Sea is a strategic trade route so that it becomes one of the policy priorities. Strategic value does not necessarily bring benefits, but also brings security threats such as piracy, piracy and kidnapping with a ransom demand. In an effort to overcome this, since 2017 the Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement in the Port Visit scheme has been built between the three countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The purpose of this study is to analyze the form of Port Visit cooperation and to analyze the Indonesian Defense Diplomacy Strategy in this cooperation. This research uses defense theory, strategy theory, and defense diplomacy theory. This study uses a qualitative descriptive analysis research method. The data collection carried out in this study used primary data through interviews and secondary data from a literature review of journals, books, reports, and internet-based sources. The Trilateral Port Visit Indomalphi cooperation is a response in dealing with transnational crimes in the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea area. With various series of activities, this cooperation plays an important role in efforts to maintain regional security and stability and provides the authority to maintain the safety of all Indonesian citizens as mandated by the law. The Indonesian Defense Diplomacy Strategy in the Indomalphi Port Visit is aimed at increasing mutual trust and military capacity in terms of coordination, communication and piracy capture training. Therefore, the defense diplomacy strategy in this study can be said to have fulfilled the two main characters of defense diplomacy, namely; defense diplomacy to build mutual trust (CBMs) and defense diplomacy to build defense capacity (CB).

This research focuses on understanding Indonesia's defense diplomacy efforts in strengthening defense cooperation with South Korea. This research specifically looks at opportunities and challenges in defense cooperation between Indonesia and South Korea using defense diplomacy. This study uses a qualitative method using two types of data: primary data through interviews and secondary data collected from various sources such as electronic publications and electronic media. This study finds that Indonesia has built defense diplomacy that opens up new opportunities for defense cooperation and strives to overcome challenges in defense cooperation between the two countries through various forms of defense diplomacy. This study concludes that Indonesia's defense cooperation with South Korea in Indonesia's defense diplomacy is a strategic step to improve Indonesia's defense capabilities. The implications of the results of this study are to improve the quality and quantity of bilateral contacts between military defense officials and defense diplomacy strategies and show the importance of defense diplomacy in maintaining relations with other countries.

In achieving its main tasks, the Indonesian Air Force carries out defense diplomacy, which is manifested in various fields of cooperation with the Air Forces of friendly countries. One of the goals is to increase intelligence capabilities. The research problem is that the implementation of defense diplomacy in increasing the Indonesian Air Force's intelligence capabilities has not been optimal. The aim of the research is to analyze the implementation of defense diplomacy carried out by the Indonesian Air Force and the defense diplomacy strategy in increasing the Indonesian Air Force's intelligence capabilities. This research uses a qualitative method with a descriptive design. Data was obtained from predetermined informants and then analyzed using qualitative analysis techniques. The research results illustrate that defense diplomacy has an influence on the strength and capabilities of the Indonesian Air Force, one of which is related to intelligence capabilities. The Indonesian Air Force has implemented defense diplomacy in the form of cooperation with the Air Force of friendly countries in various activities or fields, but it is still limited in the intelligence sector, thus having an impact on the Indonesian Air Force's intelligence capabilities. The defense diplomacy strategy implemented in increasing Indonesian Air Force intelligence includes, among others, through technology transfer agreements for each purchase of defense equipment, increasing the exchange of information and collection techniques, utilizing access to foreign military facilities, increasing the role of the Defense Attache, developing and strengthening agreements with the Air Forces of friendly countries, expanding partnerships in the field of education, through exchange programs and research collaboration. All of these steps are directed at increasing the Indonesian Air Force's intelligence capabilities through a defense diplomacy approach.

The dynamics in the regional and global scope encourage countries to implement defense diplomacy to achieve national defense and security interests. Indonesia is one of the countries that has implemented defense diplomacy and cooperated with many partners spread across various countries. However, from 2019 to 2023, Indonesia's defense diplomacy and cooperation strengthened with one country, France. This research aims to find out the motives of Indonesia's defense diplomacy towards France in the 2019-2023 period. This research uses a qualitative method with the concept of defense diplomacy motives from Frega Wenas Inkiriwang. The research uses data from books, journal articles, news, reports, and documents from official websites. The research data collection technique was conducted through literature studies and interviews. The results show that the motives of Indonesia's defense diplomacy towards France focus on the motives of strategic engagement, confidence-building measures, capacity building, and international reputation to overcome problems, such as inadequate defense equipment, limited defense technology, unfulfilled MEF I and II targets, lack of human resources capable of mastering defense technology, and the interests of maintaining the integration of the Republic of Indonesia. This study found that Indonesia should keep developing diplomatic connections with France to strengthen the defense industry's capabilities and the competency of the Indonesian National Military personnel. Nevertheless, the Indonesian government must establish a monitoring mechanism for cooperation in procuring defense equipment and staff training. This guarantees the continuation of the cooperation agreement, which promotes Indonesia's defense capabilities and independence. Indonesia is not intended to become dependent on France due to the ongoing collaboration; instead, it is designed to assist in developing national defense.

Defence diplomacy is an increasingly important tool for strategic engagement used by states in Southeast Asia. This approach underpins simultaneous cooperation and competition in the contemporary Indo-Pacific region amid major power rivalries and growing activity in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. The rise of China and the intensifying Sino–US competition has caught Southeast Asia at a geostrategic pivot where smaller states’ strategic autonomy is increasingly difficult to manage. To address uncertainty in contemporary international relations, Southeast Asian states tend to hedge omnidirectionally. This helps them to avoid entrapment, abandonment, and over-dependence on any one major power. Such an adaptive combination of bilateral, multilateral, and minilateral defence diplomacy and security cooperation allows these states to diversify their relations with several bigger powers, avoiding direct involvement of outside powers in Southeast Asian affairs while delaying having to choose sides between China and the United States. This is the first book-length coverage of defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia and an important update on previous studies. It bridges a gap in the literature by linking defence diplomacy to a broader theoretical framework of alignment behaviour, and offers much-needed look into smaller powers’ manoeuvring between major powers. This volume will be of interest to academics and policymakers alike, providing fresh perspectives and ideas for civilian and military decisionmakers and practitioners. More broadly, it will attract those seeking to better understand the military’s role in foreign and security policy.

Purpose: This study analyzes the strategic implications of Indonesia’s membership in BRICS on national defense and security, focusing on its potential to strengthen military cooperation, diversify defense procurement, and enhance geopolitical positioning while navigating complex global alignments. Research methodology: This study employs a qualitative method using a literature review and secondary data analysis. These sources include policy documents from the Indonesian government, international reports, and academic publications related to BRICS, defense diplomacy, and global security dynamics. Descriptive and comparative analysis techniques were used to explore the strategic implications and potential shifts in Indonesia's foreign policy. Results: The study finds that BRICS membership offers Indonesia enhanced access to alternative funding via the New Development Bank, broader defense cooperation, and opportunities to modernize military capabilities through technology transfer. It also provides a platform for more assertive defense diplomacy. However, risks include potential diplomatic friction with Western allies, internal power asymmetries within BRICS countries, and challenges to Indonesia’s non-aligned foreign policy stance. Conclusions: Indonesia’s BRICS membership can bolster national defense and strategic autonomy if managed with diplomatic prudence. A balanced foreign policy is essential to leverage the advantages of BRICS while preserving partnerships with Western powers and ASEAN allies. Investment in cybersecurity, military modernization, and defense diplomacy is crucial for long-term stability. Limitations: This study relies solely on secondary data, limiting insights into internal policy dynamics and practical implementation. Contribution: It offers a strategic perspective on Indonesia’s BRICS engagement and its implications for defense diplomacy and national security.

This paper addresses Morocco’s defence diplomacy through a consideration of two research matters. The first concerns the military and security cooperation of the country with the United States, the European countries, as well as the Arab and African ones. The second focuses on Morocco’s participations in United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peacekeeping operations. The objective of this study is essentially to show to what extent Morocco contributes to restoring regional peace and security across the world.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has since the turn of the new century experienced a double transformation gap: between global and regionally oriented allies and between allies emulating new military practices defined by the United States and allies resisting radical change. This article takes stock of these gaps in light of a decade's worth of collective and national adjustments and in light of counter-insurgency lessons provided by Afghanistan. It argues first of all that the latter transatlantic gap is receding in importance because the United States has adjusted its transformation approach and because some European allies have significantly invested in technological, doctrinal, and organizational reform. The other transformation gap is deepening, however, pitching battle-hardened and expeditionary allies against allies focused on regional tasks of stabilization and deterrence. There is a definite potential for broad transformation, our survey of officers' opinion shows, but NATO's official approach to transformation, being broad and vague, provides neither political nor military guidance. If NATO is to move forward and bridge the gap, it must clarify the lessons of Afghanistan and embed them in its new Strategic Concept.

Transnational crimes, especially terrorism, were committed by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) on the Indonesian – Malaysian Sea border considered by Indonesia as a threat that can disrupt the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia. Because transnational crimes occur on the borders of three countries, they cannot be handled independently. Therefore, Indonesia together with Malaysia and the Philippines carry out defense diplomacy in the form of a Trilateral Cooperative Agreement (TCA) to deal with transnational crimes in the border area. The purpose of this study is to analyze Indonesia's defense strategy in handling transnational crimes at Indonesia's maritime borders. – Malaysia - Philippines and analyzes Indonesia's defense diplomacy in handling transnational crimes at the Indonesia - Malaysia - Philippines sea border. This study uses a qualitative phenomenological method. Data collection was conducted by interview and literature study (Trilateral Cooperative Agreement TCA) is a response in dealing with transnational crimes in the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea region. With its various series of activities, this collaboration plays an important role in efforts to maintain regional security and stability. The Indonesian Defense Diplomacy Strategy in the TCA aims to increase mutual trust and defense capabilities in terms of coordination, communication and joint exercises. Therefore, the defense diplomacy strategy in this research can be said to have fulfilled two main characters of defense diplomacy, namely; defense diplomacy to build mutual trust and defense diplomacy to build defense capability. Besides being able to reduce the number of transnational crimes at the sea borders of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.

Both Indian and American declaratory policy clearly shows an interest in improving the once-unstable relationship between the two states. Beginning with Rajiv Gandhi’s government in the 1980s Indian Policy has opened more and more to the West, hoping to establish both economic and security ties with the world superpower. Despite recent claims to a “natural” alliance between India and the United States, relations have never truly been so amiable or a political to assume friendship. While the world’s two largest democracies” Share may interest and ideologies, fussing the countries in such a liberal alliance have not been possible. Relations between the two states were usually defined by ambivalence if not distaste, in the formative years of cold war Politics.After India’s victory in the 1971 war, the US, U.S.S.R and China changed Policy to South Asia, recognized India’s preeminence by default. However Washington’s Luke-warm response to South Asia generally matched with its continued support for Pakistan’s military throughout the Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 1980’s depend Indian resentment of U.S hegemony. Even in the early 190’s element of the Indian public remained highly skeptical and unwilling to entangle them in western affair. Despite India’s Persistent desire to challenge the global hegemonic order and emerge as an independent, disentangled power. It has recently been moving closer and closer to that order gaining regional power all along. India’s economy has been restructured on a western model, beginning in more foreign direct investment and business contacts. It has changed its economy to a western system, is governed by democracy and the rule of law, and supports the United Nations international framework. Additionally The U.S and India have a common goal in defeating Terrorism, bringing the two militaries and governments closer and closer. India has chosen to remain independent on the nuclear perforation issue probably more than any other However recent developments in the U.S India relationship on this issue have done much to bring India to the superpower table and further deepen the relationship. Cooperation in economics surely will have an import on issues of war and peace. However, we may want to consider the current relationship between the United States and China before we give these arguments full explanatory status. China is currently the United States “Largest trading partner and sends many of its citizens to American universities and businesses. However, as we will see below this does not yield automatic cooperation on issues of security. Many Americans still view china with skepticism in this area. Increased economic contacts have not yield an interesting to concentrate on the increase of security dialogue between Indian and the United States, as

NATO Enlargement—Was There a Promise?