Abstract
Side-channel attacks on cryptographic chips in embedded systems have been attracting considerable interest from the field of information security in recent years. Many research studies have contributed to improve the side-channel attack efficiency, in which most of the works assume the noise of the encryption signal has a linear stable Gaussian distribution. However, their performances of noise reduction were moderate. Thus, in this paper, we describe a highly effective data-preprocessing technique for noise reduction based on empirical mode decomposition (EMD) and demonstrate its application for a side-channel attack. EMD is a time-frequency analysis method for nonlinear unstable signal processing, which requires no prior knowledge about the cryptographic chip. During the procedure of data preprocessing, the collected traces will be self-adaptably decomposed into sum of several intrinsic mode functions (IMF) based on their own characteristics. And then, meaningful IMF will be reorganized to reduce its noise and increase the efficiency of key recovering through correlation power analysis attack. This technique decreases the total number of traces for key recovering by 17.7%, compared to traditional attack methods, which is verified by attack efficiency analysis of the SM4 block cipher algorithm on the FPGA power consumption analysis platform.
Highlights
A safe encryption system must be reliably realized for every section from the initial design to the nal implementation
In 1998, Huang et al from NASA put forward an empirical mode decomposition algorithm [23], a new adaptive timefrequency signal analysis method, which extracts intrinsic mode functions from the signal depends on its own characteristics. is method can be applied to effectively analyze nonlinear unstable encryption signals, which is considered to be a breakthrough in the traditional linear stable time-frequency signal analysis method, as we mentioned before
We show the results of the proposed empirical mode decomposition (EMD) data-preprocessing method compared with the state-of-the-art attack method as in [24, 25] through SM4 power consumption attack experiments
Summary
A safe encryption system must be reliably realized for every section from the initial design to the nal implementation. The safety of implementation was omitted until Paul Kocher proposed a side-channel attack technique in 1996 [1]. Side-channel attack embraced a rapid development in the past decades; many new techniques have emerged, such as timing attack [1], power consumption attack [2], electromagnetic attack [3], fault attack [4, 5], template attack [6], combinational attack [7,8,9], and machine learning attack [10,11,12,13,14], resulting in signi cant safety hazards to encryption system implementations.
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