A Hierarchical Game Approach for Multi-Operator Spectrum Sharing in LTE Unlicensed

Abstract

Allowing cellular operators to offload data traffic to unlicensed spectrum has the potential to significantly increase the capacity of the cellular network systems. This paper considers the spectrum sharing among multiple cellular operators in the unlicensed spectrum. One of the main challenges for this system is how to control the interference between the cellular users and the unlicensed users in other networks, e.g., Wi-Fi, and the interference among cellular users of different operators. As such, we develop a hierarchical game where there is a Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining game among leaders and a Stackelberg game between operators and mobile users (MU). Accordingly, multiple operators can negotiate with each other for the revenue obtained from the unlicensed spectrum and use a pricing mechanism to control the interference caused by each MU to other operators and users in other unlicensed networks. Simulation results show that our proposed strategy significantly increases the revenue and utility for both operators and MUs.