Abstract
I defend the actualist higher-order thought theory against four objections. The first objection contends that the theory is circular. The second one contends that the theory is unable to account for the alleged epistemic position we are in with respect to our own conscious mental states. The third one contends that the theory is unable to account for the evidence we have for the proposition that all conscious mental states are represented. The fourth one contends that the theory does not accommodate the intimacy we have with our own conscious mental states. To some extent, my defense will be heterodox, in the sense that I will show that some objections are satisfactorily answerable even if we concede to the objectors a point that higher-order theorists do not seem to be willing to concede, that is, that the theory is the result of conceptual analysis.
Highlights
Higher-order theories of consciousness have an almost paradoxical status: they are inspired by a principle that sounds offhand plausible, but they have been bombarded with a volley of objections.1 The relevant principle is the so-called transitivity principle: it says that conscious mental states areA
Rosenthal (1997, p. 735) is perfectly aware of the danger. He says that if all states were conscious, the actualist higher-order thought (HOT) theory would be circular. Is he right about that? It is not obvious: if one takes both ‘‘all states are conscious’’ and ‘‘a conscious mental state is a state that is the object of a mental state’’ to be conceptual truths, one may conclude that the actualist HOT theory is circular, for on this view the concept of mental state entails the concept of state consciousness
The provision precisely says that inner misrepresentation cannot occur. Such a move is supposed to satisfy the objector for the following reason: if it is true that the intimacy thesis is validated on independent grounds, why should a theory of intransitive state consciousness accommodate it on his own? In other words: if the intimacy issue is independent of the question ‘‘what is it for a mental state to be conscious?’’, why should a theory of state consciousness accommodate intimacy on his own? In Rosenthal’s words: Still, though higher-order theories do not on their own rule out such misrepresentation, they do not imply that it can, or ever does, occur
Summary
Higher-order theories of consciousness have an almost paradoxical status: they are inspired by a principle that sounds offhand plausible, but they have been bombarded with a volley of objections. The relevant principle is the so-called transitivity principle (see Rosenthal, 2000): it says that conscious mental states are. The higher-order theory I will defend is the actualist higher-order thought theory, in its original formulation Such theory has it that our mental states are conscious just in case we have an assertoric thought about them. Concerning the objections raised by Goldman and Rowlands, I will argue that they are satisfactorily answerable even if we concede to the objectors a point that Carruthers and other higher-order theorists do not seem willing to concede, that is, that theory is the result of conceptual analysis. In this sense, my defense will be heterodox.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
