A Hard Place: The United States and the Creation of a New Security Apparatus in Iraq

Abstract

This article analyses the preparations and implementation of US-led Security Sector Reform in Iraq between March 2003 and January 2005. The Iraq experience shows that detailed planning is necessary to avoid a post-conflict security gap, including a realistic notion of foreign security force numbers and of the time they will need to take a lead in providing security. Rampant insecurity following the fall of Baghdad and the lack of US SSR plans led to ad-hoc attempts to stand up, transform and reform Iraq's security services. The US lacked a central hub to coordinate its efforts in the first 18 months. Scrambling to push Iraqis to the front lines of security, the US emphasized numbers over quality, outsourced training to neighboring countries and private companies, created an auxiliary force (the ICDC) beholden only to the US military unit that trained and commanded it, and, later, specialized units in the police and the army dedicated to fighting insurgents. They were ultimately ineffective, unable to demobilize Iraq's growing militias, and later became beholden to sectarian influences under Iraq's sovereign governments. The chief shortcoming in the initial stages lay in neglecting the urgent need to build security institutions at same time as training recruits, that is, standardized training and a clear command structure, personnel and management policies, political responsibility, and oversight (by ministerial inspectors, the judiciary and popular representative bodies).