Abstract
O conflito de interesses entre executivos e proprietários é uma questão amplamente difundida na academia, já documentada em 1932 por Berle e Means, trazendo à tona o clássico conflito de interesses entre agente e principal discutido pela Teoria da Agência. A premissa por trás da governança corporativa é que as pessoas que estão dentro das corporações não necessariamente agem visando o melhor para os provedores de fundos. Partindo deste pressuposto, o trabalho em questão visa verificar a influência dos aspectos de governança corporativa na eficiência das empresas de capital aberto brasileiras. O estudo une técnicas de otimização estática através de Análise Envoltória de Dados (DEA) para identificar a eficiência das empresas de capital aberto, com Dados em Painel para identificar a influência da governança corporativa na eficiência das empresas. Os dados foram coletados manualmente dos relatórios 20-F da Security Exchange Commission (SEC) das empresas brasileiras que possuem American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), já que a base de dados não está disponível, no Brasil, de uma forma completa. Grande parte das hipóteses foi confirmada, evidenciando as condições particulares das finanças corporativas no Brasil no que tange a Governança Corporativa. A incipiência do mercado de capitais brasileiro é percebida em várias análises, ressaltando que o histórico do sistema corporativo brasileiro é um dos limitantes da eficiência das empresas. As condições que prevalecem são: (i) alta sobreposição propriedade-direção; (ii) conselhos de administração de baixa efetividade; (iii) em grupos familiares, os papéis dos acionistas, dos conselhos e da direção não são bem definidos; (iv) existe pouca clareza quanto à relação benefício-custo da boa governança; (v) baixa eficácia dos conselhos de administração; e (vi) indícios de conflitos de interesses, relativizados por incentivos explícitos e implícitos.
Highlights
Conflicts of interest between managers and owners is an oft-studied issue in academia, first documented in 1932 by Berle and Means, exposing the classic conflict of interest between agent and principal discussed by agency theory
The use of technical efficiency to measure company performance, according to Destefanis and Sena (2007), can be justified in many ways: (i) technical efficiency is a good indicator of performance in underdeveloped capital markets because it diminishes the importance of measures based on share price, which may not fully reflect information in the marketplace; (ii) where there is separation between capital and control, managers’ inappropriate behavior generates a reduction in technical efficiency, which is captured in the analysis; and (iii) in the economics literature, several authors have demonstrated the existence of a substantial relationship between ownership structure and efficiency (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Belkaoui & Pavlik, 1992)
With respect to executive compensation, this variable was positive when analyzed separately, thereby not rejecting Hypothesis 1. This relationship is consistent with the studies of Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Kaplan (1994a), who show that executive compensation can positively impact shareholder wellbeing and company performance of the company because it provides the executive with incentives to resolve the agency problem
Summary
Conflicts of interest between managers and owners is an oft-studied issue in academia, first documented in 1932 by Berle and Means, exposing the classic conflict of interest between agent and principal discussed by agency theory. This study seeks to add corporate governance to the literature on production efficiency in the context of institutional differences in the Brazilian environment to complement previous studies that only consider outputs as measures of efficiency Among those studies are the works of Belkaoui and Pavlik (1992) and Hitt and Ireland (1986), who used the logarithm of revenue or market capitalization as a dependent variable to measure company performance. For Zheka (2005), technical efficiency is a useful proxy because it is a single aggregate measure of using input factors to produce desired outputs relative to efficiency This analysis enables an examination of the root of the corporate governance problem and, of the inefficient use of resources. The use of technical efficiency to measure company performance, according to Destefanis and Sena (2007), can be justified in many ways: (i) technical efficiency is a good indicator of performance in underdeveloped capital markets because it diminishes the importance of measures based on share price, which may not fully reflect information in the marketplace; (ii) where there is separation between capital and control, managers’ inappropriate behavior generates a reduction in technical efficiency, which is captured in the analysis; and (iii) in the economics literature, several authors have demonstrated the existence of a substantial relationship between ownership structure and efficiency (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Belkaoui & Pavlik, 1992)
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