Abstract
To address the incomplete information dynamic network attack and defense game in practice, this paper proposes a generalized approach to solve for perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) for practical network attack and defense. To consider “role-shifting” in the practical network attack and defense environment, the proposed approach substitutes solving the Nash equilibrium (NE) problem with a payoff (reward) maximization problem via a profound combination between the subgame perfect NE of the complete information dynamic game and the BNE of the incomplete information static game. Furthermore, to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed approach, a representative signaling game with specific values is examined from a theoretical perspective. Finally, a real penetration test case targeting a web server is implemented to substantiate the effectiveness of the proposed approach from a practical perspective with some visual verifications and crucial penetration codes, where the attacker successfully obtains the ROOT authority (the highest authority) of the target web server.
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