A General Theory of Business Ethics?

Abstract

Professor Jeurissen’s paper contains some interesting insights, but is disappointing by its very high level of generality. The relationship between micro, meso and macro levels in business ethics is an elusive topic and I have doubts about the usefulness of stories with such a very comprehensive scope. What is challenging in the field of business ethics — at least in my opinion — is not so much general or methodological stories, but the presentation and treatment of particular issues. General stories in this field mostly yield contestable or even doubtful statements expressing the benevolence of the author rather than the state of the world. A good example in the text at hand is the following sentence: “We are shifting towards a more communicative, more accountable, and more socially responsible type of market economy.” In a sense this is true. Look for instance at the efforts of the chemical industry around Antwerp to eliminate any damage to the environment. Partly as a result of green criticism, Bayer is investing huge amounts of money in research aiming at the replacement of chlorine technology by alternatives. However, at the same time, very few of the managers or owners of private firms whom I meet at seminars on business ethics seem to consider tax evasion or tax fraud as reprehensible (and I suppose that managers paying to attend such a seminar are more ethically inspired than most of their colleagues!). Apparently they don't feel committed to the task of upholding a welfare state saving a lot of people from poverty. Maybe Jeurissens' optimistic statement is true for Belgium, Germany or Sweden. Maybe it is true for big firms that have a reputation to defend. But probably it is not true for other countries where public pressure is weaker. Probably it is true for Shell in the Netherlands, but not for Shell in Nigeria. Probably it is true for some stakeholders, but not for others. I can illustrate my criticism of the excessive generality of Jeurissen’s approach in another way. Recently I took part in a debate about the production of weapons with some politicians and with the manager of an important Flemish firm. Partly as a result of deliberate action on the part of the Flemish government, we no longer have an arms industry in Flanders. However we still have some firms producing some items which are used within very sophisticated armament systems. For most of these firms this kind of activities represents only a small part of their turnover but they do not want to abandon it. Now this is not only a microproblem for some firms or for their managers who pretend to be concerned about ethics. It is also a policy problem: should the government prohibit any production for the armament industry? Or should it simply abstain from supporting these activities? If you are not a total pacifist — someone who finds that all weapons should be forbidden — then this is not a simple problem. My problem with Jeurissen’s text is that it gives me very few clues about how to tackle (not to mention “solve”) this kind of problem. Most authors on business ethics — and Jeurissen is no exception — refer to the stakeholder model of the firm. Now this model offers only a formal framework for analyzing particular cases. It reminds us of the fact that the management of a firm has to balance the interests of the stockholders against the interests of employees, consumers, neighbours and the larger community within which the firm is situated. In a sense, this is precisely the task of a philosopher: to remind the decision-makers of the complexity of practical