Abstract
A social choice hyperfunction picks a non-empty set of alternatives at each admissible preference profile over sets of alternatives. We analyze the manipulability of social choice hyperfunctions. We identify a domain D λ of lexicographic orderings which exhibits an impossibility of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite type. Moreover, this impossibility is inherited by all well-known superdomains of D λ . As most of the standard extension axioms induce superdomains of D λ while social choice correspondences are particular social choice hyperfunctions, we are able to generalize many impossibility results in the literature.
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