Abstract
A requirement of procedural fairness is introduced and imposed on game forms. According to this axiom, everybody should be able, by varying unilaterally one`s strategy while keeping the others' strategies fixed, to produce the same set of outcomes. This axiom is called « Equality of Attainable Sets ». A necessary and sufficient condition for Nash implementability with Equality of Attainable Sets is provided under a mild domain restriction. This condition is shown to be equivalent to Nash implementability in structured models where each agent is homo oeconomicus.
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