A General Attribution Theory for the Psychology of Religion

Abstract

A formal theory demonstrating the applicability of attribution concepts and research findings to the psychology of religion is developed and discussed. First, an overview of attribution theory is presented, wherein it is argued that three basic needs or desires of people - viz., for a sense of meaning, for control over outcomes, and for self-esteem - are evident throughout the attribution process; this trichotomy of motives provides a basic framework upon which the structure of the theory is based. It is maintained that religious and naturalistic meaning-belief systems often -exist concurrently within a person's world view, and that specific factors can be identified which predict whether a religious or a non-religious explanation of an event will be made in a particular case. These factors are discussed in terms of four broad categories: characteristics of the attributor, the attributor's context, characteristics of the event, and the event's context. Specific examples developed within each of these categories provide links to the existing research literature of the psychology of religion, as well as a wide range of testable empirical hypotheses for future research. Causal explanation is a hallmark of religion. Around the world, in all periods of recorded history, scripture and theologies have told how the universe was created, why humans occupy a special place in the scheme of things, why seasonal changes and natural disasters occur, why some people triumph while others fail, and why everyone must occasionally suffer and eventually die. One obvious task for the psychology of religion is to characterize the ways in which ordinary people use such religious explanations. Informal observation suggests that not everyone relies on them to the same extent, and that not even the most religious people (at least in our culture) explain every occurrence in religious terms. There must be, then, a set of factors which determines when religious explanations are deemed appropriate. Moreover, there is a host of interpretive options within every religious framework - God's mercy, God's justice, saints, guardian angels, the devil, correctly or incorrectly executed rituals, effective or ineffective prayers, right or wrong conduct - to name a few from the Judeo-Christian tradition. What determines which, if any, of these causes will be called upon when a person attempts to account for a particular