A game-theoretic framework for dynamic cyber deception in internet of battlefield things

Abstract

Cyber deception techniques are crucial to protect networks in battlefield settings and combat malicious cyber attacks. Cyber deception can effectively disrupt the surveillance process outcome of an adversary. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for cyber deception to protect important nodes and trap the adversary. We present a sequential approach of honeypot placement to defend and protect the network vital nodes. We formulate a stochastic game to study the dynamic interactions between the network administrator and the attacker. The defender makes strategic decisions about where to place honeypots to introduce new vulnerabilities to the network. The attacker's goal is to develop an attack strategy to compromise the nodes of the network by exploiting a set of known vulnerabilities. To consider a practical threat model, we assume that the attacker can only observe a noisy version of the network state. To this end, both players solve a partially observable stochastic game (POSG). Finally, we present a discussion on existing techniques to solve the formulated game and possible approaches to reduce the game complexity as part of our ongoing and future research.