A game-theoretic approach to behavioral food risks: The case of grain producers

Abstract

Food risks may be caused by malpractice of suppliers who exploit the fact that their production processes and resulting product properties cannot be directly observed by buyers. The probability of malpractice increases with the profits that can be earned through opportunistic behavior. In this paper, we develop a moral hazard model for the empirical analyses of behavioral risks. It accounts for the essential fact that incomplete inspection and tracing increase the profitability of rule-breaking behavior, and that monitoring, tracing and sanctioning are costly. Using the model, we first demonstrate how to design efficient contracts in various situations. In a case study, we then analyze farmers’ incentives with regard to the minimum waiting period after fungicide use. Data are gathered in interviews with three large-scale German farmers and a grain dealer. We find that, while their perception of parameters varies widely, high temptations for rule-breaking arise in some cases. We conclude that empirical moral hazard analyses have significant potential to shed light on behavioral risks.