Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic has caused high fluctuations in the demand for medical supplies. Therefore, emergency medical supplies enterprises have faced challenges in decision making and need to consider more corporate social responsibility (CSR) in production. At the same time, the government needs to take considerable measures to support emergency medical supplies enterprises. As such, our paper researches the decision and coordination problems for emergency medical supply chain considering CSR with the government, manufacturer, and retailer. The manufacturer produces emergency medical supplies. It has additional production technological innovation efforts to improve supply efficiency and assume CSR. The retailer faces uncertain demands and is responsible for undertaking CSR to meet the demands. The government must implement a certain degree of subsidies to ease the impact of the pandemic on emergency medical supply chain enterprises. Meanwhile, our paper further explores the obligations of the economy, society, and efficiency of enterprises under the COVID-19 pandemic and the decision making of enterprises for the implementation of CSR. Based on the principle of maximizing social welfare, we discuss decentralized decision making (without government and with government) and centralized decision making, respectively. On this basis, our paper not only designs a wholesale price–cost sharing joint contract coordination mechanism but also proves that a joint contract can achieve supply chain coordination under certain conditions. Through the analysis, we observe: (1) Government subsidies can improve the enthusiasm of supply chain members to undertake CSR; (2) With the improvement of the retailer’s CSR level, the profits of supply chain members and overall performance have improved to a certain degree; (3) To improve supply efficiency and assume social responsibility, the manufacturer implements technological innovation investment. However, it will impose some burden on the manufacturer. Government subsidies allow the manufacturer to balance between social responsibility and its profit.

Highlights

  • Introduction published maps and institutional affilThe global outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic at the end of 2019 has caused a huge impact on the world economy and increased the risk of global economic recession [1].According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the world has lost at least US $3 trillion due to the pandemic and the economic growth rate has dropped by 1.5pp

  • We model an emergency medical supply chain engaged in corporate social responsibility (CSR) and government subsidy composed of one manufacturer and one retailer

  • In view of the optimization of profit and social welfare, our paper comprehensively studies the factors, for example, game behavior, contract coordination, and the impact of the pandemic among enterprises in the emergency medical material supply chain and builds a three-echelon emergency medical supply chain consisting of the government, the manufacturer, and the retailer

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Summary

Literature Review

Our study summarizes four linked research aspects, namely, emergency supply chain management, social welfare and corporate social responsibility, government intervention, and wholesale price–cost sharing joint contract. The above literature has never simultaneously considered government policies, social welfare, CSR, emergency medical supply chain management, and contract coordination. Our paper shows that the joint contract combining wholesale price with cost sharing can attain the coordination of emergency medical material supply chain considering corporate social responsibility. Based on government subsidies, a three-stage game model of the manufacturer and the retailer implementing CSR and government participation in decision making is appropriately established, and the impact of the CSR effort of member enterprises on demand, the supply chain itself, and the entire social welfare are comprehensively considered.

Model Descriptions and Assumptions
Decision Model of Emergency Medical Supply Chain during the Pandemic
Manufacturer-Led Centralized Decision Game Model
Numerical Comparison of Different Cases and Parameters Sensitivity Analysis
Numerical Analysis of Equilibrium Results
Impact of Retailer’s CSR Level on Equilibrium Results
Coordination Effect Analysis of Wholesale Price–Cost Sharing Joint Contract
Concluding Remarks
Managerial Implications
Limitations and Future Scopes
Full Text
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