Abstract
ABSTRACT This article offers a game theory-based theoretical framework for explaining the Israel–Hamas indirect ceasefire negotiations in the decade attending the Islamist organisation’s takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007. It shows that Hamas’s relentless commitment to Israel’s destruction notwithstanding, whenever the two adversaries reached ad hoc agreements, both collaborated (however, indirectly) in maintaining a state of calm. As such, the proposed analytical framework provides a useful tool for conflict management analysis in terms of actions, duration and modes of settlement.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
