Abstract
Exploring the relationship between competition and cooperation in water resource exploitation by applying a game model is crucial for achieving stable equilibrium in the presence of environmental externalities. To explore this, we used the Poyang Lake Basin, which is divided into three overly exploited sub-regions, as an example. This paper selected the different types of sub-regions of Poyang Lake Basin as the research subjects, and then proposed a game model to study evolutionarily stable equilibrium strategies. The results are as follows: (1) the behavior of the sub-regions of Poyang Lake Basin are affected by one another and cannot achieve equilibrium through independent games, which also need external forces to coordinate the three reaches; (2) the benefits improve gradually from the state of “non-cooperation” to “full cooperation” and reach an ideal equilibrium when all the sub-regions choose the strategy of cooperation; (3) the strategic choice of sub-reaches is difficult to maximize the overall benefits of the basin in the absence of external constraints. To ensure that the sub-regions choose the cooperative strategy, the central government should support the cooperative subsidies of local governments. In addition to improving the equilibrium state of the sub-reaches, this study proposes the following policy implications: constructing a basin plan and promoting fiscal transfer payments, inducing an industrial gradient transfer, and strengthening the payment for the use of water resources.
Highlights
In recent years, water resource exploitation has been an important way to achieve regional development in many countries [1,2]
(1) In this situation, when one of the participants chooses the strategy of cooperation, it means that other members need to provide acceptable and undifferentiated water resource services to one another
The value of the water resources service is increased to 2S due to the mutual provision of water resources when three parties choose the strategy of cooperation
Summary
Water resource exploitation has been an important way to achieve regional development in many countries [1,2]. It is important to improve the coordinated development of water resource exploitation among the upper, middle, and lower reaches of the basin and provide perspectives for solving the regional conflict between the local interests and overall interests of the basin. Under such circumstances, exploring sustainable coordination and its mechanism could have critical implications for basin managers [18]. The motivation of this study is derived from the conflict that involves water resource exploitation among the local governments that surround the Poyang Lake Basin, China [21,22] These regions have utilized increasing amounts of water resources in the process of rapid economic growth in recent years [23]. This paper considers Poyang Lake Basin as an example, and we use the dynamic game theory model and propose a theoretical framework to investigate multiple regions to achieve sustainable and coordinated development
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