A game theory approach to the logic of illegitimate behavior induced during land conflict litigation in urban and peri-urban areas of Pakistan

Abstract

We aim to explain the logic of extended land conflict litigation procedures as a strategic interaction utilizing Game Theory. We integrated the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC, 1908), functional in Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, and Pakistan, with Alternative Dispute Resolution System (ADRS) as strategic options for the incumbents into two interactive game-theoretic models with alternative scenarios. First, litigation for land possession, having land title; Second, litigation for land title, having land possession. The standard litigation procedure is reasoned, and the analytical framework is established from pertaining laws and incumbents' behavior. The games achieve Nash equilibrium only if the litigation cost increases the utility of land at any level forcing incumbents to converge to ADRS. Alternatively, the legal procedure follows the prisoner's dilemma and extends for decades, inducing illicit behavior ascertaining the incumbents to gain possession or title by involving land grabbers and officials. Thus, corresponding game-theoretic models of land grabbing and corruption are established. High litigation costs, lack of transparency, the informality of land, and lack of cadastral information keep illegal behaviors unchecked. Finally, the paper suggests policies to improve the land administration and legal system to manage land conflicts to make cities safe, resilient, and sustainable.