A game theory approach for an emergency management security advisory system

Abstract

Efficient emergency management must determine how and when to alert and advise the critical and appropriate response units to the danger of terrorist attacks, particularly when available resources are limited. We propose a framework for homeland security advisory system that incorporates two game theory models designed to advise response units and raise the alarm. In the first scheme the interactive behaviors between the elements or participants of the multi-emergency response system and the zone response unit are modeled and analyzed as a non-cooperative game, after which the terrorist threat value is derived from the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. In the second step the value TTV is used to compute the Shapley value of all response units for five different threat levels; fair response unit allocation based on the Shapley value creates a minimum set of SAS deployment costs. Numerical examples show that the emergency manager can use this framework to quantitatively evaluate the terrorist threat to each response unit and easily discover where response units are most at risk within the five threat levels.