Abstract
The coordinator is a specific node that controls the whole network and has a significant impact on the performance in cooperative multihop ZigBee wireless sensor networks (ZWSNs). However, the malicious node attacks coordinator nodes in an effort to waste the resources and disrupt the operation of the network. Attacking leads to a failure of one round of communication between the source nodes and destination nodes. Coordinator selection is a technique that can considerably defend against attack and reduce the data delivery delay, and increase network performance of cooperative communications. In this paper, we propose an adaptive coordinator selection algorithm using game and fuzzy logic aiming at both minimizing the average number of hops and maximizing network lifetime. The proposed game model consists of two interrelated formulations: a stochastic game for dynamic defense and a best response policy using evolutionary game formulation for coordinator selection. The stable equilibrium best policy to response defense is obtained from this game model. It is shown that the proposed scheme can improve reliability and save energy during the network lifetime with respect to security.
Highlights
Both the security and the quality of service (QoS) of ZigBee wireless sensor networks (ZWSNs) are important factors which will affect various services of sensor data delivery, for example, environmental monitoring [1], building monitoring to assess earthquake damage [2], and intelligent home monitoring [3]
We show the network lifetime increase over the basic IEEE 802.15.4/ZigBee configuration when fuzzy logic and evolutionary game for the defense response policy are applied to a network with coordinators failures owing to heavy attacks
We have presented a coordinator selection scheme for ZWSNs to defend action from malicious nodes and minimize the cost of wireless transmission energy
Summary
Both the security and the quality of service (QoS) of ZWSNs are important factors which will affect various services of sensor data delivery, for example, environmental monitoring [1], building monitoring to assess earthquake damage [2], and intelligent home monitoring [3]. If one coordinator node from the same coalition is unreliable owing to heavy attack, coordinators failures can occur; a coordinator selection mechanism would be required for sensor data delivery in the same coalition In this context, two key questions are (i) how to form coalitions among sensor nodes to share the reliable coordinator to minimize the cost of energy and (ii) how to defend attacker to meet the required QoS requirements. Two key questions are (i) how to form coalitions among sensor nodes to share the reliable coordinator to minimize the cost of energy and (ii) how to defend attacker to meet the required QoS requirements To answer these questions, a joint dynamic defense and coordinator selection scheme are proposed using game theoretical concepts.
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