Abstract
We develop a model of strategic predator—prey interaction in which the latter has a certain range of actions available whose cost is inversely correlated with escape ability ("quality"). Under the assumption that each herd of prey is generated by random independent draws from the whole population, we investigate the issue of whether such actions may become signals of quality in an evolutionarily stable equilibrium. Necessary and sufficient conditions for this are derived, which essentially hinge on the existence of an appropriate size (neither too wide nor too narrow) of the action range. The bounds of such range, which are parameters of our model, would reflect considerations of "surprise", characteristics of the habitat, etc, in terms of which empirical evidence may be evaluated.
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