A Game-Theoretic Model of Marketing Skin Whiteners

Abstract

Empirical studies consistently find that people in less developed countries tend to regard light or “white” skin, particularly among women, as more desirable or superior. This is a study about the marketing of skin whiteners in these countries, where over 80 percent of users are typically women. It proceeds from the following premises: a) Purely market or policy-oriented approaches toward the risks and harms of skin whitening are cost-inefficient; b) Psychosocial and informational factors breed uninformed and risky consumer choices that favor toxic skin whiteners; and c) Proliferation of toxic whiteners in a competitive buyer's market raises critical supplier accountability issues. Is intentional tort a rational outcome of uncooperative game equilibria? Can voluntary cooperation nonetheless evolve between buyers and sellers of skin whiteners? These twin questions are key to addressing the central paradox in this study: A robust and expanding buyer's market, where cheap whitening products abound at a high risk to personal and societal health and safety. Game-theoretic modeling of two-player and n-player strategic interactions is proposed in this study for both its explanatory and predictive value. Therein also lie its practical contributions to the economic literature on skin whitening.