Abstract
In this paper, a game theoretic model for supply chain coordination problem is studied. The supply chain coordination problem involves one manufacturer and multi-suppliers with quality variations under demand uncertainty. The number of defective parts purchased from suppliers is unknown to the manufacturer while each supplier can determine the standard deviation of defective items. The relationship between the manufacturer and the suppliers is modelled by a non-cooperative game. The non-cooperative game model is analysed by the Stackelberg equilibrium where the manufacturer is regarded as a leader and the suppliers as followers. By deriving suppliers’ best response functions, the Stackelberg equilibrium under uncertainties is established. Sensitivity analysis is conducted to investigate the features of the proposed models with cost parameters. The results validate the derived managerial insights derived for the proposed model.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: International Journal of Systems Science: Operations & Logistics
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
