Abstract
This paper analyses a simultaneous game of network formation and information acquisition where the benefit structure is such that the benefit that an agent derives from the network she is located in depends on the maximum information that someone in her neighbourhood, including herself, acquires. It turns out that in equilibrium star network emerges as the unique equilibrium with the central player alone acquiring information and the rest sponsoring link with her. Further for a large range of cost of link formation, in equilibrium there is underinvestment in information.
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