A Game Analysis of the Supervision Model for Preventing Tunneling Behavior in China's Family Firms

Jing Tang,Minghao Shen

doi:10.1109/bife.2011.5

A Game Analysis of the Supervision Model for Preventing Tunneling Behavior in China's Family Firms

Jing Tang, Minghao Shen

https://doi.org/10.1109/bife.2011.5

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Publication Date: Oct 17, 2011

Affiliation: South China University of Technology, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies

#Behavior In Family Firms #Family Firms + Show 8 more

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Abstract

Recently, it has become a hot issue to prevent the controlling family from tunneling listed companies. This paper aims to apply the analytical framework of the collusion theory to conduct the research onto the tunneling behavior in family firms. With the use of game theory, a supervision model for preventing tunneling behavior is established and some countermeasures are proposed.

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