Abstract
Recently, it has become a hot issue to prevent the controlling family from tunneling listed companies. This paper aims to apply the analytical framework of the collusion theory to conduct the research onto the tunneling behavior in family firms. With the use of game theory, a supervision model for preventing tunneling behavior is established and some countermeasures are proposed.
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