A Framework for Resource Allocation in Multi-Service Multi-Rate Overlay Networks Based on Microeconomic Theory

Abstract

A significant issue in overlay multicasting is designing self-organizing mechanisms that can be able to utilize the natural selfishness of users in such a way that leads to maximization of the total utility of the system. We present a competitive economical system including dynamic algorithms for joining and leaving in which a number of services are provided to the users by a number of origin servers. Each offered service can be considered as a commodity and the servers and the users who relay the services to their downstream nodes can thus be considered as producers of the economy. Also, the users can be viewed as consumers in the economy. On joining to the network, each user is provided with a budget and tries to get hold of the services. We use Walrasian equilibrium to show existence of market-clearing prices. The system is proved to be scalable and experimental results confirm that our proposed mechanism works near-optimal.