A Framework for an Empirical Ethics

Abstract

Empirical ethics, as the term is used in this paper, may be understood as the study of moral practice and of the moral judgments employed within such practice. One aspect of such an ethics is the analysis of the meaning of terms employed in moral judgments. In this study we are concerned with the relations between the rules of usage for such terms as “good”, “interest”, “value”, and others. But these rules of usage are not to be thought of as merely semantical; rather, they are rules which state how the terms are to be used or interpreted if certain results are to be produced in specified kinds of moral situations. That is to say, since moral judgments and their constituent terms perform an important instrumental role within moral practice, it is possible both to formulate rules for the use of these instruments, and also to study the relations between these instruments (i.e., terms) which result from the application and use of these rules.