Abstract
Richard Wollheim pointed out a paradox which he claims relates to democracy. We argue that this paradox is not exclusively related to democracy but actually arises whenever there is a conflict between personal preferences and preferences of accepted authorities. Furthermore, we provide a formal explanation of how one can rationally ?accept? or ?switch to? the preference of the authority she personally accepts and still have different preferences than the authority in question. Our formal solution is based on dynamic epistemic logic, while our philosophical explanation is inspired by Kant?s practical philosophy. On the other hand, we point out to what we believe to be the real exclusive restriction in democratic elections and we argue that, unlike Wollheim?s paradox, this restriction is a special feature of democracy.
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