A forest peacebuilding mechanism for the world’s most fragile states

Abstract

Resource scarcity within a fragile state can lead to cooperation or within-state conflict. Cooperation is more likely when local peacebuilding mechanisms are part of a national peace framework. A new local peacebuilding mechanism, shared forest cooperatives (SFC), is proposed here. Designed to stabilize peace in rural communities, SFC refers to a network of local councils. Each council manages a living bank, namely annual dividends harvested from a forest ecosystem or other perennial plants. SFC’s backbone for managing forest dividends is Elinor Ostrom’s common-pool resource principles. Each SFC group relies on the backbone when choosing its own rights, rules and obligations. Ostrom’s monitoring principle of higher-level support, or polycentrism, presents difficulty for fragile states. Outside intervention covers binding decisions, technical expertise and hosting neutral space for face-to-face dialogue initially. SFC’s design, theory and practice draws from four elements: 1) where SFC fits within the current intervention practices, 2) SFC’s reliance on shared land usage and occupancy typical for most of the world’s nine most fragile states, namely Somalia, Yemen, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, Sudan, Afghanistan, Central African Republic and Syria, 3) adapting Elinor Ostrom’s common-pool resource principles for sharing each living bank’s dividends 4) better governance based on local peace council experiences. Elements are folded into a synthesis and its critique then policy implications. Socially fragile, SFC is proposed as a 2-for-1 mechanism for building peace in rural communities while minimizing forest loss.