A few remarks concerning a science of sensory phenomena

Abstract

Which domain of science should investigate sensory objects, such as colours, sounds, smells, tastes, pain, pleasure, annoyance, 2 and so forth? This depends on a philosophical issue of the greatest importance, to wit, the relation of the sensory world relate to material and mental realities, if indeed such realities exist apart from the sensory world at all. As our question depends on one of the most important of philosophical issues, it is not surprising that we can find all possible answers in the thinkers of the past. The core of such an answer is based on how the individual author views the nature o f sensory facts. For some authors, such as Mach, sensory objects are the sole element of experience and reality. There are not two worlds, material and mental; there is but one world, namely 'impressions'. 'Impressions' form the subject matter of both physics and psychology. Psychology and physics do not differ in the subject matter under investigation, but only in the aspects in which they consider the selfsame object. The psychologist investigates impressions in relation to the nervous system; the physicist does so independently of this system. This trend identifies sensory phenomena with phenomena in general; thus, each science dealing with reality becomes a phenomenology. According to this view, sensory phenomena occupy a high place among the objects of scientific investigation, as they form the subject matter both of physics and of psychology. According to another view, sensory phenomena are physical objects, belonging to the subject matter of physics. This opinion appeals to those who follow Aristotle inseeing sensory qualities as real objects, such as the neorealists and Neoscholastics. The subject matter of psychology is facts of another kind, facts given in inner experience. Others again, see no difference between a psychic act and its object and regard sensory phenomena as mental objects, belonging to the subject matter of